A new revolution is imminent in Iran
Once again, the streets of Iran are crowded with people. Aside from pushing for economic demands, they call for the resignation of Khamenei (“The Grand Leader”). When one is not familiar with the daily changes in Iran, it is easy to ask “what has changed since the Iranians filled the streets with opposition in the past?”. In this article, I will explain what has changed, and what these changes mean.
In the stream of history, now flows in the past & the future
Our understanding of the current situation depends on our knowledge of the past. According to Hegel, being is not an absolute state, but an ever-changing becoming. Consequently, I will summarize the main events in Iran’s history since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. It will explain the different phases of people’s movement that have brought us here, and what the future holds.
As a starting point, let’s consider the fact that all economic, political, and social problems were attributed to the war. In August of 1988, the war ended, so people’s expectations began to rise. They wanted the coupon system of distribution lifted and lines for shopping for essential goods eliminated. Their desire to return to normalcy was strong. They yearned for the revolutionary committees and IRRGC to be disbanded. And other demands, such as the abolition of executions and arrests, freedom of the press, etc.
As it turned out, the opposite occurred. The dual economy emerged with Rafsanjani & Khamenei at the helm. There were fewer and fewer necessities available at formal prices, and a “Free Market” arose. Where all goods were abundant at staggering prices. Lines for items with government prices grew even longer. Instead of abolition, the revolutionary committees were purged of non-radicals personal. Also, a ministry status was granted to the IRRGC, making it a permanent player in the “Game of Thrones”. And the poor intellectuals and opposition remained suppressed and mass arrests were still the daily routine.
Round one
Iranians tend to be patient with their rulers. The tolerance of two thousand five hundred years of dynasties and 43 years of chaos in the Islamic Republic are proof of it.
It wasn’t until the second term of Rafsanjani’s presidency, seven years after the end of the war, that the signs of the people’s disappointments became evident.
As a result of a food line altercation outside a supermarket in Islam Shahr, a low-income suburb of Tehran, a riot broke out in April of 1995. There were days of clashes between armed repressive forces and the people protesting against the skyrocketing prices of goods. The whole town was involved. After days of rioting, the IRRGC was only able to suppress the riots with the use of gunship helicopters. Thousands died, were injured, and were arrested. The protest was the first of its kind since the 1979 revolution. A completely spontaneous movement with only economic demands. There were no political demands made.
Due to this riot, nearly every section of society was affected.
The “Imam Line”, the hard-liners who were responsible for the US Embassy takeover and hostage crises, relying on Khomeyni’s support, had occupied almost all effective positions in the government. As a result of his death, however, they began to lose ground to the newly formed Rafsanjani-Khamenei alliance. They saw this riot and the obvious resentment of the people as an opportunity to ride the wave back to power. In a short period of time, they shed their skin and declared themselves “Reformists” and “heroes of liberalism”.
Intellectuals, also, who were silenced and marginalized during the war, gradually made their way back into society with newly found courage. Among this group, the student movement was at the forefront of separating from Islamic Fundamentalism and becoming more independent. Several movements, such as women’s rights, which had disappeared after the revolution, began to reorganize their scattered pieces.
These newly formed conditions set the stage for another blow to the ruling faction.
“The Reformists”
Towards the end of Rafsanjani’s second term, it became evident that the fundamentalists had gathered around the speaker of the parliament (Majlis), Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri, who was despised by the public, to succeed him. After Khamenei publicly endorsed him, everyone felt the election of 1997 had already ended.
Although reformists attempted to persuade Mir Hossein Moussavi, who served as prime minister during the war, to run for office, they were unsuccessful. Therefore, they were forced to go along with Sayyid Mohammad Khatami, an almost anonymous figure to the public.
Meanwhile, people’s pride was hurt by how they were treated and taken for granted. With full force and organizational know-how, intellectuals and students entered the election campaign. With the approaching election date, people’s excitement was starting to be felt more strongly. In spite of this, the fundamentalists were positive of the outcome on the basis of their usual methods of tampering with votes.
The turnout for the election of 1997 surprised everybody. The ballets drew 36,5 million registered voters, 80 percent of those eligible to vote. 70 percent (20,078,187) voted for Khatami, while 24 percent (7,242,859) voted for Nategh-Nouri. No vote tampering could succeed with a difference that large.
Taking advantage of the rift in the ruling class, the middle class returned to the social arena. The newly formed alliance won the council election in 1999 by 75 percent and the parliamentary election in 2000 by 70 percent.
In the beginning, rests an end
In the power game, “the Reformists” were back, but they were also worried about the societal changes that have become the determining factor in politics. The masses!
Thus, they were concerned that the masses would become more radicalized than was necessary to save the system. Ultimately, if the whole system was threatened, so was their existence.
For the fundamentalists, it was only natural that they would try to put the genie back in the bottle and prevent the reformists from succeeding in their plans. In every instance when reformists or those who followed them attempted to take advantage of their constitutional rights, fundamentalists used violence to break them up and disperse them.
The uprising of July 1999 in Tehran and Tabriz is a great example.
A reformist newspaper, Salaam, was shut down that day. The students at Tehran and Tabriz Universities started to protest confined to their dormitories. However, the police and IRRGC personnel, the armed tugs of the fundamentalists, attacked them with brutality. They broke everything in the students’ room. They beat the students with the intention of killing them and even threw some of them from the upper floors into the courtyard.
The news of this incident spread through the city, and people rushed to the students’ defense. Protests against this assault led to a mass uprising. For many days, the public protested and called for the arrest and indictment of those responsible. Throughout this ordeal, reformists called for calm and urged protesters to return to their houses. As the protesters marched toward Khamenei’s residence (“Grand Leader”), the IRRGC threatened to open fire on them with live ammunition if they got too close. Finally, after a number of deaths and thousands of arrests, due to the insistence of reformists and their hollow promises to arraign and arrest those responsible for the attacks on students, the people gradually began to disperse.
Afterward, it became clear that reformers were not willing and unable to support the people. Each time the fundamentalists took the offensive, they retreated and left the people’s side for the “sake of the greater good” and “preventing the enemies of Islam take advantage of the situation.” When Khatami, the “reformist” president, admitted that “the presidency in the Islamic Republic has no power and is only an errand boy,” this became increasingly clear. Hence the decline of reformists from positions of leadership and of power.
continues …
